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Censorship in Secondary School Newspapers: 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
l. INTRODUCTION 
In the secondary school context, censorship applies to both restric-
tions on publication and upon distribution of student newspapers. The 
purpose of censorship in this context is to protect those about whom the 
expression speaks and those to whom the expression speaks. The Su-
preme Court in Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier1 recently catego-
rized first amendment protection for student speech in student created 
newspapers based on a distinction between school-supported newspa-
pers (official) and non-school-supported (underground) newspapers dis-
tributed on a secondary school's campus. The Court held that school-
supported newspapers are not within the purview of the First Amend-
ment because they have a specific educational purpose. 2 In regulating 
such newspapers, school administrators may impose whatever restric-
tions they choose so long as the restrictions are related to teaching con-
cerns. 3 In comparison, the Court implied that underground newspapers 
constitute a public forum for expression of student thought and as such 
merit some constitutional protection.• The Court further implied that 
had the school-supported paper in Hazelwood been opened to indis-
criminate use by the public, it would have lost its exempt status and 
become a public forum, subject to the protections of the First 
Amendment. 11 
While this Hazelwood categorization for determining First 
Amendment protection creates a clearer, more precise distinction in ap-
proaching First Amendment analysis, it also creates greater confusion 
in that no clear interpretation is provided as to what combination of 
activities and what extent of those activities is sufficient to change a 
newspaper considered outside the bounds of the First Amendment to a 
newspaper subject to the previous Court-defined protections of the First 
Amendment. 
This note will discuss the general aspects of the Hazelwood case, 
the evolving standard for allowable restraints on student expression in 
I. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). 
2. !d. at 570. 
3. /d. at 57 I. 
4. /d. at 570-71. 
5. /d. at 567-69. 
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student newspapers, and the Hazelwood addition to that standard. Fol-
lowing these discussions, it will conclude with an evaluation of the Ha-
zelwood addition. 
II. THE Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier CASE 
The principal of Hazelwood High School, in accordance with a 
written school policy,6 deleted two full pages of the official school news-
paper which contained five articles, two of which were deemed objec-
tionable.7 The authors of the deleted articles subsequently brought an 
6. The Hazelwood School Board Policy No. 348.5 read as follows: 
Student Publications 
a. Students are entitled to express in writing their personal opinions. 
The distribution of such material on school property may not in-
terfere with or disrupt the educational process. Such written ex-
pressions must be signed by the authors. 
b. Students who edit, publish or distribute hand-written, printed or 
duplicated matter among their fellow students within the schools 
must assume responsibility for the content of such publications. 
c. Libel, obscenity, and personal attacks are prohibited in all 
publications. 
d. Unauthorized commercial solicition [sic] will not be allowed on 
school property at any time. An exception to this rule will be the 
sale of non-school sponsored student newspapers published by stu-
dents of the District at times and in places as designated by school 
authorities. 
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1377 nn.6 & 7 (8th Cir. 1986). 
/d. 
The Hazelwood School Board Policy No. 348.51 read as follows: 
School Sponsored Publications 
School sponsored publications will not restrict free expression or diverse view-
points within the rules of responsible journalism. School sponsored publications are 
developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications in regular 
classroom activities. 
Students who are not in the publications classes may submit material for consider-
ation according to the following conditions: 
a. All material must be signed. 
b. The material will be evaluated by an editorial review board of 
students from the publication classes. 
c. A faculty-student review board composed of the principal, publica-
tions teacher, two other classroom teachers, and two publications 
students will evaluate the recommendations of the student editorial 
board. Their decision will be final. 
No material shall be considered suitable for publication in student pub-
lications that is commercial, obscene, libelous, defaming to character, advo-
cating racial or religious prejudice, or contributing to the interruption of the 
education process. 
7. One article objected to by the school administration expressed the story of three Hazel-
wood East High students' experiences with pregnancy. The other article discussed the impact of 
divorce on several Hazelwood East High students whose parents had been divorced. Hazelwood, 
108 S. Ct. at 565. 
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action in the Eastern District Court of Missouri. 8 The district court 
refused to apply the test established in Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen-
dent Community School District9 of restricting student expression only 
if it materially disrupts classwork, involves substantial disorder, or in-
vades upon the rights of others. 10 The court concluded that, in the con-
text of a high school newspaper case, the Tinker test applies only to 
papers which are public fora 11 and not to papers that are an integral 
part of school curriculum. 12 Accordingly, the district court found that 
the deletion of the articles was not forbidden under the Constitution.13 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision 
and held that the school newspaper was a "public forum for the ex-
pression of student opinion" and that the two articles objected to by the 
administration could not "reasonably have been forecast to materially 
disrupt classwork, give rise to substantial disorder, or invade the rights 
of others."14 The Court of Appeals, premising their holding on the cri-
teria set out in Tinker, held that the school could not censor publica-
tions in an official school newspaper unless tort liability for the school 
could arise from the publication. 111 
The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing Hazelwood, re-
versed the Court of Appeals and sided with the Eastern District Court 
of Missouri. The Supreme Court stated: 
[S]chool facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school 
authorities have by "policy or by practice" opened those facilities "for 
indiscriminate use by the general public" .... If the facilities have 
8. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
9. 393 U.S. 503 ( 1969). See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
10. Id. at 513. 
11. A public forum is any meeting place or medium used for open discussion or pursuing 
remedies. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 1979). 
Many different places have been found to be public fora. See generally Hague v. C.l.O., 307 
U.S. 496 (1939) (streets, sidewalks and parks are considered to places constituting a public fo-
rum); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (city theater may be a public 
forum). 
Conversely, other places have been found not to constitute public fora. See generally Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (libraries are not traditionally a public forum); Hefron v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (fairground is a limited public 
forum); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jailhouse is not a public forum); Greer v. Spack, 
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base is not a traditional public forum); Perry Education Ass'n v. 
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (school's internal mail system is not a tradi-
tional public forum); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (advertising spaces on a 
municipally-owned transit system are not public fora); Los Angeles v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789 (1984) (a city utility pole is not a public forum). 
12. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1466. 
13. /d. 
14. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1370. 
15. !d. at 1376. 
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instead been reserved for other intended purposes, "communicative or 
otherwise," then no public forum has been created, and school offi-
cials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, 
teachers, and other members of the school community.18 
The Court further explained that a public forum is not created simply 
"by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intention-
ally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."17 Accord-
ingly, the Court said that deleting the offensive articles was wholly 
within the bounds of the Constitution because the school officials "did 
not evince either 'by policy or by practice' any intent to open the pages 
of Spectrum [the newspaper] to 'indiscriminate use' by its student re-
porters and editors, or by the student body generally. Instead they 're-
serve(d) the forum for its intended purpose(s)' as a supervised learning 
experience. " 18 
The Court invalidated the application of the Tinker criteria to re-
straints imposed upon official school newspapers. The Court stated: 
It is this standard [of intent to open the paper to indiscriminate use], 
rather than our decision in Tinker, that governs this case. . . . 
[W]hether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particu-
lar student speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is dif-
ferent from the question whether the First Amendment requires a 
school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.19 
Accordingly, the Court rejected the suggestion that school officials may 
only apply prior restraints on school-sponsored publications pursuant 
to specific written regulations. To hold otherwise would "unduly con-
strain the ability of educators to educate."20 In addition, the Supreme 
Court explicitly refused to address "whether the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly construed Tinker as precluding school officials from censoring 
student speech to avoid 'invasion of the rights of others' except where 
that speech could result in tort liability to the school."21 
Ill. STATUS OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT oF FREE SPEECH IN SECONDARY ScHooLs 
Throughout history, courts have viewed schools as society's train-
16. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 568 (citing Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). 
17. ld. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)). 
18. ld. at 569 (citing Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. at 46 & 47). 
19. Id. (emphasis added). 
20. ld. at n.6. 
21. ld. at n.5 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 
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ing grounds. 22 Accordingly, these courts have upheld restraints on mi-
nors' rights of free speech that support the values of society.23 In order 
to fully understand the impact and significance of the Hazelwood deci-
sion, one must examine the history of federal court cases addressing 
restraints on secondary school student expression. 
A. judicially Created Restraints on Free Speech m Secondary 
Schools 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 24 secondary school students wore black armbands in protest of the 
United States' policy towards Vietnam. The students were suspended 
for this act although their protest was peaceful and caused no substan-
tial disruption to school activities. The students challenged the school's 
suspension on free speech grounds. The Supreme Court, in reviewing 
this case, upheld the students' rights to peacefully protest. However, the 
Court held that students' freedom of speech rights are limited to ex-
pressions which (1) do not materially disrupt classwork, (2) do not in-
volve substantial disorder, or (3) do not invade upon the rights of 
others. 211 This three-pronged test set the foundation for future free 
speech challenges in secondary schools. 
In a later case, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 26 the 
Supreme Court faced a similar issue involving a school's power to cen-
sor student expressions. In Bethel, a student was suspended for giving a 
lewd nomination speech filled with sexual innuendos at a school-spon-
sored assembly. The student challenged the school administration's ac-
22. "Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of 
expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the 
'work of the schools.' " Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986) (citing 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (A school is "a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment."). Cf Board of Educ., 
Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Gainsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); Frasca 
v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
23. Cf Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 
(1982); Gainsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 
106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
A few examples of such restraints that are prevalent in our current social system are restric-
tions on driving, buying alcohol, curfew hours, ratings of certain movies, and voting. 
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
25. [C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it 
stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 
/d. at 513. See also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966). 
26. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). 
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tion basing his position on free speech grounds. The Supreme Court 
upheld the school administration's sanction and limited the student's 
right of free speech. The Court stated: 
[C]onstitutional rights of students in public schools are not automati-
cally coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings .... It does 
not follow ... that simply because the use of an offensive form of 
expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker 
considers a political point, that the same latitude must be permitted to 
children in a public school.27 
Although in Bethel no substantial disruption occurred as a result of the 
speech, the Court justified the school's sanction because the penalties 
were unrelated to any political viewpoint, and for the Court to allow 
such a "vulgar and lewd speech ... would undermine the school's basic 
educational mission."28 Thus, Bethel added a judicial gloss to the crite-
ria set forth in Tinker. 
B. Limitations on Secondary School Students' Rights Of Free Speech 
As Applied To "Underground" Student Newspapers 
Underground newspapers are not part of the school curriculum 
nor are they officially recognized by the school as a school paper. The 
courts have granted limited First Amendment protection to student ex-
pression in underground newspapers. Although the issue has never 
been addressed by the Supreme Court, many lower federal courts have 
faced this issue and have justified prior restraints based on the content 
of such newspapers.29 These courts have done so on the same grounds 
stated by the Supreme Court in Tinker and Bethel-to protect against 
disruption, substantial disorder, infringement upon the rights of others, 
and diminishing a school's ability to accomplish its educational 
mission. 30 
The federal courts have implied that underground student news-
papers which are not composed, printed, or distributed on the school 
premises would receive complete First Amendment protection. 31 These 
27. /d. at 3164. 
28. /d. at 3166. 
29. See Bystrom v. Fridley High School, Indep. School Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 
1987); Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent. School Disl., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979); 
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971 ); Burch v. Barker, 651 F. Supp. 
1149 (W.O. Wash. 1987); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 
1971). 
30. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (disruption, substan-
tial disorder, and infringement upon rights of others); Bethel School Disl. No. 403 v. Frazer, 106 
S.Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986) (school's educational mission). 
31. See Eisner, 440 F.2d at 808; Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 750; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052; 
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same courts, however, have dictated guidelines for constitutionally per-
missible administrative restrictions32 which create both procedural and 
substantive limitations when an underground newspaper is distributed 
upon a secondary school's campus. 
The procedural requirements for constitutionally permissible re-
straints all provide for screening of any printed material before distri-
bution upon a school's campus. However, the procedures of screening 
are limited in order to protect the students' right of expression. First, 
any submitted material must be reviewed within a definite brief period 
of time.33 Second, the procedures must specify to whom and how mate-
rial may be submitted for clearance.34 Third, the procedures must ex-
plain how appeals should be made from an adverse decision. 311 Fourth, 
the decision of whether prior restraints may be placed upon a certain 
expression or whether an offending author may be punished, must be 
made by an impartial and independent decision-maker. 36 Fifth, school 
administrators cannot punish the authors of off-campus expressions 
simply because they reasonably foresee the possibility of in-school dis-
tribution.37 And finally, the procedures must not be vague or 
overbroad. 38 
Substantive requirements focus on a balance between the school's 
interests and the student's constitutional rights. The courts have held 
that any administrative restriction which requires review and approval 
before distribution must not threaten any student author nor prohibit 
distribution on school property unless the distribution materially inter-
feres with normal classroom activity or normal school functions. 39 Bare 
allegations of interference with normal classroom activity or school 
functions based on undifferentiated fears or apprehensions of distur-
bance are not sufficient to support regulation. There must be a demon-
strable, reasonable basis for interference with student speech."° Fur-
Sullivan, 333 F. Supp. at 1 1 62; Burch, 651 F. Supp. at 1 155. 
32. See generally Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1048; Eisner, 440 F.2d at 810; Burch, 651 F. Supp. 
at 1157-58. 
33. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 81 0; Burch, 651 F. Supp. at 1 156 ("[T]ime limits for decision mak-
ing must exist at every level of the appeal process."). 
34. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 81 1; Burch, 651 F. Supp. at 1157. 
35. Burch, 651 F. Supp. at 1157. 
36. The courts, however, fail to define who or what constitutes an impartial and independent 
decision-maker. In Thomas, the school board was deemed impartial and independent. Thomas, 
607 F.2d at 1048. 
37. /d. at 1053-54 (Newman, J., concurring). 
38. If the regulation contains vague or overbroad statements, those portions of the regulation 
are considered to be invalid on their face. See Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 750; Eisner, 440 F.2d at 81 1. 
39. Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1169-70 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
40. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; t;isner, 440 F.2d at 810; Sullivan, 333 F. Supp. at 1070 (re-
quiring actual interference with normal school activity or functions). 
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thermore, prior restraints may only be used in specific instances when 
no regulation as to time, place, or manner would avert the potential 
harm.'n In the eighth circuit, this requirement is interpreted very 
broadly; school authority to censor is limited to situations which would 
result in tort liability for the school.42 
The federal courts have also specified the subject matter which is 
outside of First Amendment protection. One justifiable restraint applies 
to material judged to be obscene to minors.43 Materials are deemed ob-
scene if, taken as a whole, they appeal to prurient interests, depict or 
describe sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and lack serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.44 In addition, certain ma-
terial may be considered obscene to a minor although that same mate-
rial would not be considered obscene to an adult.'' 11 Another justifiable 
restraint applies to material presenting a clear and present likelihood of 
substantially disrupting discipline within the school.46 The rationale for 
allowing restraints on material likely to cause student disruption is that 
the school must be able to meet the state's educational goals or the 
school ceases to be of value. Finally, material advertising any product 
or service not permitted to minors by law;" or expressions which are 
libelous, indecent, or vulgar,48 are subject to prior restraint regulations. 
C. judicial Deference to Administrative Restraints On Secondary 
School Student Speech As Applied To "Official" School 
Newspapers 
Until Hazelwood, the Supreme Court had never addressed free 
speech rights for students writing in an official school newspaper. 
However, the Eastern District Court of New York addressed the issue 
41. Burch, 651 F. Supp. at 1155. 
42. Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 753-54. The Bystrom court holding was in accordance with the 
Eighth Circuit Court decision in Hazelwood. The Eighth Circuit's decision was subsequently 
overruled. However, in so doing, the Supreme Court expressly refused to decide whether tort 
liability to the school was a limitation on valid prior restraints for publications in a school-sup-
ported newspaper. See Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 570 n.5. 
Potential tort liability becomes an issue because parents are required to send their children to 
schools wherein the children can experience the educational process. When a student's rights of 
privacy and access to education are violated, the school fails in reaching the state's educational 
goals. The school may be liable to the injured student for not preventing or guarding against such 
violations. 
43. Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 751. 
44. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
45. See generally Gainsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
46. See, e.g., Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 754. 
47. Id. at 753. 
48. /d. at 752-53. 
291] HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT v. KUHLMEIER 299 
in the case of Frasca v. Andrews.'9 This court, like the Supreme Court 
in Hazelwood, saw the official school newspaper as presenting a situa-
tion outside of the bounds of constitutional protection.~0 In Frasca, the 
school principal prevented distribution of the school's official newspa-
per although no written restriction policy existed. He did so on the 
basis that the contents of two of the letters to the newspaper's editor 
were objectionable. The principal claimed that a contentious letter from 
the school's lacrosse team and the editors' defiant response to it~ 1 were 
bound to cause substantial disruption and that another letter, from an 
anonymous party, unfairly infringed upon the rights of one particular 
student. ~2 The Frasca court basically applied the Tinker standard and 
upheld broad prior restraint discretion in favor of the school adminis-
tration. In so doing, the court held that for prior restraints on publica-
tion and distribution of student expressions within the official school 
newspaper, the Constitution did not require that the school's restric-
tions be written in order to be valid. ~3 
IV. THE Hazelwood CASE RATIONALE 
In Hazelwood, the Court held that the student articles were not 
protected by the First Amendment because they were printed in a 
school paper deemed "curriculum." By so doing, the Supreme Court 
added a new preliminary inquiry to the Tinker criteria. This new in-
quiry determines whether the Tinker criteria are applicable to allow 
limited First Amendment protection to particular student speech. Ha-
zelwood establishes a new prong which requires a determination as to 
whether the student speech is being offered through a newspaper con-
sidered to be established for educational purposes or through a newspa-
per considered to be established for public discourse. If it is through a 
newspaper for public discourse, then the Hazelwood protective zone for 
educational purposes is pierced and the Tinker criteria apply to deter-
mine the constitutional protection of the student's speech. If, on the 
other hand, the student's speech is offered through a newspaper for 
educational purposes, then there is no constitutionally protectable inter-
est at stake, and thus no standard nor criteria need be applied and the 
school authorities may regulate the speech regardless of whether a writ-
49. 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
50. The official school newspaper is a newspaper supported by the school with funds, equip-
ment, a supervisor, and, often, with academic credit for participation on the editorial staff. See 
generally Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 565. 
51. Frasca 463 F. Supp. at 1046. 
52. The anonymous letter severely criticized the then vice-president of the student govern-
ment. /d. 
53. /d. at 1049-50. 
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ten policy exists. With the newspaper for educational purposes, the 
only limitation on the school authorities is that their actions be "reason-
ably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."114 
A. Appropriateness Of The Hazelwood Standard 
The scope and appropriateness of restraints in the secondary 
school environment is an oft-considered dilemma.66 The courts, as the 
final arbitrator, often end up balancing the competing interest of the 
state and the individual in an effort to secure justice. Ideally this bal-
ancing should rest with the legislature. However, in the secondary 
school atmosphere, judicial balancing is often required. There is a fine 
line between discipline necessary to enhance learning and restraints 
that deform and smother learning. On the one hand is the need to teach 
students how to work within society-how to present ideas in a legally 
and socially acceptable manner. On the other hand is the fact that too 
many restraints or too much control stifles the learning process; and 
both students and society suffer. 
Under present systems, states have assumed a definite responsibil-
ity in educating their youth, in teaching good citizenship, and in pro-
tecting and preserving constitutional rights. The Constitution of most 
states preserves the right to a public education.66 Citizens of every state 
pay taxes in support of this educational right. In addition, most states 
have compulsory statutory provisions which require adults who have 
legal control over minors to send those minors to public or private 
schools. 67 The interest and liability of the state therefore becomes sub-
54. Hazelwood, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4082. 
55. See Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: the Conflict Between Authority and Indi-
vidual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986); Churton-Hale, Tinker Goes to the 
Theater: Student First Amendment Rights and High School Theatrical Productions in Seyfreid 
v. Walton, 11 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 247 (1984). 
56. ALA. CoNST. amend. 284; ALASKA CoNST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CoNST. art. XI, § 1; 
ARK. CoNST. art XIV,§ 1; CAt.. CoNST. art. IX,§§ 1 and 5; CoLo. CoNST. art. IX, § 2; CoNN. 
CoN ST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CoNST. art X, § 1; FLA. CoNST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CoN ST. art. VII, 
§ 1; HAw. CoN ST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CoNST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; INn. 
CoNST. art. VIII,§ 1; IowA CoNST. art. IX, pt. 2, § 3; KAN. CoNST. art. VI,§ 1; KY. CONST. § 
183; LA. CoN ST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CoNST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; Mo. CoNST. art. VIII, § 1; 
MAss. CoNST. § 91; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1 and 201; MINN. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1; Miss. 
CoNST. art. 8, § 201; Mo. CoNST. art. IX, § 1(a); MoNT. CoNST. art. X, §§ 1 and 2; NEB. 
CoNST. art. VII,§ 1; N.M. CoNST. art. XII,§ 1; N.Y. CoNST. art. XI,§ 1; N.C. CoNST. art. 
IX,§§ 1 and 2; N.D. CoNST. art. VIII,§§ 1-4; OHIO CoNST. art. VI,§§ 2 and 3; OKLA. CoNST. 
art. XIII, § 1; OR. CoNST. art. VIII, § 3; PENN. CoNST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CoNST. art. XII, §§ 1 
and 2; S.C. CoNST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CoNST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 12; TEX. 
CoNST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CoNST. art. X, § 1; Y.r. CoNST. ch. II, § 68; VA. CoNST. art. XIII, 
§ 1; WASH. CoNST. art. IX, §§ 1 and 2; W.VA. CoNST. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CoN ST. art. X, § 3; 
WYo. CoNST. art. VII, § 1. See also N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4 ~ 1. 
57. For example, the state of Utah's compulsory education statute reads: 
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stantial when student expression interferes with the school's educational 
mission or infringes upon the rights of others.68 
Students also have substantial interests both in receiving educa-
tion69 and in enjoying the constitutional right of free speech.60 In sec-
ondary schools, educating should be the primary objective. The atmo-
sphere should be one of learning. Apprehension, fear, or anticipating 
negation and restriction as a result of expressing one's views may stifle 
the learning process. "Students ought to have access to a variety of 
views ... anything less than candor about how the world works, will 
induce either boredom or cynicism."61 
The school atmosphere plays an influential role in the psychologi-
cal and sociological development of a student's attitude toward him-
self-toward his individual abilities, his relationship to the world's situ-
ations, his facility in social interaction, and his development of personal 
goals, aspirations, and ideologies.62 These self-evaluating attitudes cre-
ate the individual; eventually they affect society at large.63 Restrictions 
on a young student's expression of individualism or intellectual insight 
53-24-1. MINOR REQUIRED TO ATTEND SCHOOL- PENALTY FOR VIOLATION. 
( 1) Any person having control of a minor between six and 18 years 
of age is required to send the minor to a public or regularly es-
tablished private school during the school year of the district in 
which the minor resides. 
(2) It is a misdemeanor for a person having control of a rninor under 
Subsection (1) to willfully fail to comply with the requirements 
of this chapter. A district board of education shall report cases of 
willful noncompliance to the appropriate juvenile court. Officers 
of the juvenile court shall immediately take appropriate action. 
UTAH CoDE AN!'!. § 53-24-1 (1986). 
Many states only require minors to receive an 8th grade education. Eg. ARIZ. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 15-321 (B)(4) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 80-1504 (1947); IOWA CODE§ 299.2 (1971); 
S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 13-27-1 (1967); WYo. STAT. ANN.§ 21.1-48 (Supp. 1971). 
58. Thomas v. Board of Educ. 607 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1979) (the school has sub-
stantial educational interest in avoiding the impression that a student expression has been author-
ized by the school when, in fact, it has not been authorized). 
59. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (right to 
education is not considered to be a fundamental right, yet it has significance to both individuals 
and society); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[E]ducation is perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments."). 
60. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 506 ( 1969). 
61. Shrag, Are We Willing to Pay the Price of Censoring Students Education?, 98 L.A. 
Daily J., Sept. 11, 1985, at 6, col. 3. 
62. See Asimov, The Ultimate Effects of Creeping Censorship, 95 L.A. Daily J., May 6, 
1982, at 4, col. 3. 
63. See generally Maddocks, The 60's Recollected-Not Necessarily In Tranquility, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 11, 1988, at 19, col. 1. 
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may deform and smother the student's potential, perhaps creating a sig-
nificant danger or loss to society. 
Secondary school students, however, often lack sufficient maturity 
and experience to understand the impact of their statements and ac-
tions. If this were not so, students could be allowed to say or do any-
thing they desired, for they could be assumed responsible for all the 
ramifications and all the potential problems. 64 Yet, this is not the case. 
Therefore, restrictions on some students' constitutional rights are often 
mandated in order to protect the constitutional rights of others as well 
as to enable the school to educate. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Hazelwood created a categori-
cal determination that enables states to more easily accomplish their 
educational mission. The categorical approach, however, requires the 
courts to balance the competing interests of the state and the individual 
students. Such a balancing may be needed in the secondary school con-
text in order to find justice; and indeed, securing justice is a proper role 
of the courts. 
At first, it may appear that the Court, by using the Hazelwood 
categorical approach, has not done any balancing. However, though not 
expressly stated or explained, the Court does balance the state's interest 
against the students' interest when the Court determines in which cate-
gory the student expression is offered. For example, if the speech is 
offered through a newspaper for educational purposes, the Court will 
find the state's interest to educate greater than the student's interest in 
free speech (unless, of course, the newspaper has been opened to indis-
criminate use by the public). This must be so because any school pro-
gram inevitably infringes upon some freedom granted by the Constitu-
tion. If no granted freedom could ever be infringed upon for some 
greater cause or freedom, then the education process could never be 
accomplished in the secondary school atmosphere. Conversely, if the 
speech is offered through a newspaper that has no specified educational 
purpose, the Court will not automatically grant deference to the state's 
interest but will evaluate the student's free speech interest to determine 
whether it be greater than the interests of the state in educating. In the 
64. Accordingly, prior restraints are often justified by many practical reasons such as the 
inadequacy of sufficient sanctions against student expressors and the inadequacy of possible resti-
tution available to those injured by damaging expressions or by the resulting school disruption. See 
generally Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; 
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986); Bystrom v. Fridley High 
School, Indep. School Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747, 753-54 (8th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Board of 
Educ., Granville Cent. School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1979); Eisner v. Stamford 
Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808-10 (2d Cir. 1971); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 
& 1052 (E.D. N.Y. 1979); Burch v. Barker, 651 F. Supp. 1149, 1154-55 (W.D. Wash. 1987). 
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newspaper with no specified educational purpose, the Tinker criteria 
apply to guide this balancing. Therefore the Court, by adopting the 
Hazelwood categorical approach, has enhanced the ability of the state 
to freely educate and also has secured justice in the secondary school 
context by balancing the competing interests of individual students 
within the educational parameters established by the states. 
B. Criticisms of the Hazelwood Standard 
Although the addition of the Hazelwood categorization to the pre-
viously established standard enhances the states' ability to educate and 
allows for a balancing of individual interests, it also creates potential 
problems and confusion. The categorization gives little guidance, if any, 
to law-makers in interpreting what combinations of activities, what ex-
tent of those activities, or what degree of school support will keep a 
newspaper for educational purposes free from becoming a newspaper 
for public discourse (public forum). The Hazelwood decision states that 
because 
public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and 
other traditional public forums .... School facilities may be deemed to 
be public forums only if school authorities have "by policy or by prac-
tice" opened those facilities for "indiscriminate use" by the general 
public, or by some segment of the public, such as student 
organizations. 66 
"[B]y policy or by practice" is further defined by the Court as requir-
ing more than "inaction" or "permitting limited discourse."66 It re-
quires some element of intent on the part of the state. The Court stated 
that the government creates a public forum "only by intentionally 
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."67 The Court's 
implied definition of "indiscriminate use" seems to rest on whether the 
forum has been used for something other than its intended purposes.68 
Again, intent is the controlling factor. The Court further stated that if 
the forum had been reserved for its "intended purposes 'communicative 
or otherwise,' then no public forum has been created .... "69 Once 
again, the Court, in determining when a forum for educational pur-
65. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 568 (citing Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 n.7 (1983)). 
66. /d. (citing Cornelius v. NACCP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 802 
(1985)). 
67. /d. (emphasis added). 
68. /d. 
69. /d. (citing Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. at 47). 
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poses becomes a forum for public discourse, focuses on the intentions of 
the school authorities. 
Intent refers only to state of mind, not to what incites a person to 
act or not to act. 70 It implies some sort of purpose, aim, or design. 71 
However, there is substantial ambiguity in the Court's definition of in-
tent. The Court fails to distinguish whether the intended purpose of a 
forum applies to the activity involved, to the status of the individuals 
with access to that forum, or to both the activity and the status of the 
individuals. 
If the Court's intent focus is toward the activity, then further am-
biguities arise. For example, it must be determined what exactly is the 
intended activity of the forum. 72 Is the intended activity of the student 
newspaper simply writing? Or, is it specifically teaching journalism? 
Furthermore, it must be determined whether there is a distinguishable 
difference between the possibly intended activities (i.e. a difference be-
tween simply writing and specifically teaching journalism). If, on the 
other hand, the Court's intent focus is not toward the activity but is 
instead directed toward the status of individuals who have access to the 
forum, still further ambiguities arise. For example, it must be deter-
mined to whom the forum was intended to be open, and what actually 
constitutes access to the forum. It must also be determined what 
amount of limited access by others, not originally intended to be users 
of the forum, is sufficient to change the intended restrictive purpose of 
the forum. If the intent focus is towards both the activity and the status 
of the individuals with access to the forum, then the ambiguities created 
by both of these focuses become barriers to determining when a forum 
changes from its intended purposes to "indiscriminate use." 
Secondary school newspapers could come from totally off-campus 
resources, totally on-campus resources, or all varieties of combinations 
in between. Likewise, the amount of previous control and guidance 
given to a student newspaper could range from no control to total or 
absolute control. The Court, in creating the categorical standard for 
determining the applicability of First Amendment protection, gives only 
indiscriminate factual situations with no discussion of distinguishing 
traits to guide the determinations of the inevitable future cases within 
70. Motive is what incites a person to action. Intent refers only to state of mind with which 
the act is done or omitted. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 727 (5th ed. 1979). 
71. Witters v. United States, 106 F.2d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1939). 
72. In Hazelwood the activity was defined in the school policy governing the school newspa-
per. However, the Court nonetheless looked at the circumstances to determine whether the news-
paper forum had been reserved for its intended educational purposes. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 
568-69. 
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the extremes.78 Various combinations of the factors, or the importance 
of each factor in comparison to the others, is not covered or even al-
luded to in the Hazelwood opinion. 
In addition, because intent is a state of mind, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to establish by direct proof. Accordingly, intent must be in-
ferred from the circumstances.74 This is true for many contexts. For 
example, in the construction of a Last Will and Testament, intent or 
intention means the sense and meaning gathered from the words used 
therein. In the context of civil or criminal liability, a person's intent is 
inferred from any result possibly contemplated.711 Accordingly, the 
Court's test, "by policy or by practice" opening the forum to "indis-
criminate use," supplies no greater insight. The circumstances nonethe-
less determine the result. Any conceivable result could be construed to 
fulfill the prior intent requirement. Therefore, the Court's test pro-
fesses to give guidance but in application sheds no light on what combi-
nation of activities or what extent of those activities is sufficient to 
change a newspaper forum for a specific educational purpose to a 
newspaper for public discourse. As a result, the ambiguity in interpret-
ing the guidelines stated by the Court may increase confusion and arbi-
trariness for future decision-making. 
CoNCLUSION 
Most states have assumed some sort of a responsibility to educate 
children by requiring them to attend secondary schools. The Hazel-
wood Court, in supporting the states' education goals, has created a 
categorization for judicial balancing of students' rights within these 
educational parameters. In so doing, the Court has increased the ease in 
which educators may educate. However, by so doing without suffi-
ciently defining the judicial guidelines given, the Court has created con-
fusion and problems for both the legislature and the judiciary. 
James E. Ellsworth 
73. The factual guidelines mentioned are that there was a faculty advisor who "selected the 
editors of the newspaper, scheduled publication dates, decided the number of pages for each issue, 
assigned story ideas to class members, advised students on the development of their stories, re-
viewed the use of quotations, edited stories, selected and edited the letters to the editor, and dealt 
with the printing company." In addition, there was a scheduled class hour for which grades and 
credit were given in accordance with individual performance in the course. /d. at 568. 
74. State v. Gantt, 26 N.C. App. 554, 555, 217 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1975); State v. Evans, 219 Kan. 
515, 519, 548 P.2d 772, 777 (1976) (state of mind can be shown by the act, circumstances, and 
inferences deducible from that act or those circumstances). 
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 725-26 (5th ed. 1979). 
